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The Exclusionary Rule in Probation Revocation
Proceedings
Honorable Brian L. Crowe*
INTRODUCTION
The majority of federal and state courts deny application of the
exclusionary rule' during probation revocation proceedings,'
thereby allowing the government to make affirmative use of evi-
dence which has been obtained by unlawful police conduct. Al-
though courts have admitted evidence obtained in violation of a
probationer's fifth s and sixth' amendment rights, most of the re-
ported decisions involve the prosecutor's affirmative use of such
evidence against a probationer whose fourth amendment rights
were violated. Courts advance several reasons for denying a pro-
bationer the remedy of the exclusionary rule, including the court's
perception of the nature of probation and probation revocation
proceedings, the announced purpose of the exclusionary rule, and
the societal costs of applying the rule. Nevertheless, the court's re-
fusal to apply the exclusionary rule at a probation revocation hear-
ing frustrates the rehabilitation goals of the probation system and
the dual purpose of the exclusionary rule: deterrence of unlawful
police conduct and preservation of judicial integrity.
This article will evaluate-t4e application of the exclusionary rule
* Judge, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. B.A., Loras College; J.D., Loyola Univer-
sity of Chicago; LL.M., University of Virginia. The author wishes to make a special ac-
knowledgement to Glen 0. Robinson, John C. Stennis Professor of Law, University of Vir-
ginia, for his evaluation and helpful suggestions.
1. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. Const. amend. V provides in pertinent par: "No person shall be... compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..
4. U.S. Const. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury... and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witness against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defense.
5. See infra note 43.
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in probation revocation hearings. After explaining the nature and
purpose of the probation system, the discussion will turn to the
history and purposes of the exclusionary rule. This article will then
examine the role of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation
proceedings. Finally, it will conclude that both constitutional prin-
ciples and rehabilitation goals mandate application of the exclu-
sionary rule in a probation revocation hearing.
PROBATION PROCEEDINGS
Nature and Purpose of a Probation Sentence
Probation is a sentence imposed by a court after a conviction
that releases a defendant into the community.' The court usually
places the defendant under the supervision of a probation agency.7
A probation order may also contain such other reasonable restric-
tions and conditions as the court deems will best protect society
and rehabilitate the defendant.'
6. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973). For purposes of this article, it is neces-
sary at the outset to distinguish probation from parole. Probation and parole follow two
diverse patterns of administration and invoke the power of two different branches of the
government. Probation, unlike parole, involves active participation by the judiciary. FISHER,
PROB4TION AND PAROLE REVOCATION: THE ANOMALY OF DIVERGENT PROCE-
DURES-INTRODUCTION FOR THE FEDERAL PROBATION SYSTEM (1973). The court imposes pro-
bation as part of the judicial process of sentencing. The court, in its sole discretion, decides
whether probation should be granted in the first instance. Whitfield v. United States, 401
F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); People v. Polansky, 6 Ill. App.
3d 773, 387 N.E.2d 747 (1972); People v. Smith, 111 Ill. App. 2d 283, 250 N.E.2d 178 (1969).
The court sets the length of probation and its conditions; all questions regarding modifica-
tion of these terms and conditions must be addressed to the court. The court issues a war-
rant for the probationer's arrest for an alleged violation of probation and conducts a proba-
tion revocation hearing to determine if the probationer should remain on probation.
Parole, on the other hand, is under the jurisdiction of a parole board, an administrative
body created by statute. Once the court incarcerates a defendant, jurisdiction over him is
transferred to the board. Juelich v. United States Bd. of Parole, 437 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Lashbrook v. Sullivan, 55 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Ill. 1944). Parole is
administered by the board, which decides questions concerning length, modification of pa-
role conditions, and revocation. United States v. Wilkinson, 513 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1975).
7. Probation agencies range from those that depend upon the ingenuity of a single pro-
bation officer to large multidivisional probation departments, offering clinical, foster care,
and periodic imprisonment programs. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT 28 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE). For an analysis
of the results of various probation programs offered, when measured against the background
of the probationer, see Scarpitti & Stephenson, A Study of Probation Effectiveness, 59 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc. 361 (1968).
8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 111005-6-3 (1979). See Doug-
las v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (broad latitude is given the court in prescribing conditions
of probation in order to help probationers make necessary adjustments in society). Accord
Barnhill v. United States, 279 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1960).
Probation Revocation Proceedings
Historically, courts utilized probation as a sentence in lieu of in-
carceration only for petty and juvenile offenses. 9 In contrast, cur-
rent philosophy in the administration of criminal justice suggests
that in the absence of aggravating factors, probation, rather than
incarceration, is the appropriate disposition.10 Congress now au-
thorizes probation sentences," and courts in every state utilize
probation as a sentencing alternative. Some state statutes make
probation the presumptive sentence.' 2
The goals of criminal sentencing should focus upon deterrence of
criminal conduct and rehabilitation of the individual who stands
before the court, charged with having violated one or more of soci-
ety's rules. Incarceration rarely serves these goals. Imprisonment
offers society only temporary safety; it offers the offender the op-
portunity to be schooled by those hardened in crime. Probation
rests on the theory that first offenders, particularly the young, will
avoid future crimes if given the proper direction.'" Probation, a
system of social engineering, attempts to provide such proper di-
rection by reintegrating the defendant into the community against
which he has offended, so that he can learn to live a productive
life.' 4 The probation system has met with much success in achiev-
ing its rehabilitation goal." Moreover, an offender can be kept
9. In 1925, juvenile probation was available in every state. The same widespread use of
probation for adult offenses, however, did not occur until 1956. TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at
27.
10. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (PROBA-
TION) commentary at 386 (1974) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
12. Illinois creates such a statutory presumption in favor of the imposition of a proba-
tion sentence:
Except where specifically prohibited by other provisions of this Code, the court
shall impose a sentence of probation or conditional discharge upon an offender
unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense, and to the
history, character and condition of the offender, the court is of the opinion that:
(1) his imprisonment or periodic imprisonment is necessary for protection of the
public; or,
(2) probation or conditional discharge would depreciate the seriousness of the of-
fender's conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, V 1005-6-1 (1979). Probation may not be used, however, to obviate a
statutory mandatory minimum period of incarceration. For example, in Illinois, a sentence
of probation may not be given for "Class X" crimes, such as rape or armed robbery, because
the mandatory minimum prison sentence for such crimes is six years. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
38, 1005-6-3(c)(2) (1979).
13. United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1968).
14. STANDARDS, supra note 10, commentary at 385-86.
15. The extremely high success rate of the probation system demonstrates that the pro-
bation works as a correctional tool for avoiding future crimes. Older studies indicate a 60%
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under probation supervision at a cost much lower than that re-
quired for institutionalization, thus further increasing the advan-
tage of probation over a prison sentence.1 s
Due to these advantages, the use of probation in our country
flourishes today. For every person in prison, there are more than
four people under some form of probation supervision.17 Contin-
ued recognition of probation as a valuable correctional tool and
preservation of the integrity of the probation system are vital to
the administration of justice.
Probation Revocation Hearings
A violation of any condition of probation, such as the commis-
sion of a crime, constitutes grounds for the revocation of proba-
tion."6 If the court finds the defendant in violation of the terms or
conditions of his probation, especially if the violation involves
commission of another crime, the court most probably will termi-
nate the probation. Upon termination, the court may impose a
prison sentence for any length of time that could have been given
after a plea or finding of guilty of the original crime."' However,
to 90% success rate, measured by the number of probationers who did not have their proba-
tion revoked. England, What Is Responsible for Satisfactory Probation and Post-Probation
Outcome?, 47 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POuCE Sci. 667 (1957).
Another difference between parole and probation is the rate of recidivism. Studies reveal
that as high as 35% to 45% of all parolees are subject to revocation and return to prison.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972). Recent statistics available from the Federal
Probation System reveals a success rate for probation as high as 95%. Statistics available
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts reveal that for the twelve month
period ending June 30, 1979, 3.7% of those placed on federal probation by United States
District Courts were involved in or convicted of a new major offense. For the twelve month
period ending June 3, 1980, the rate of such violations of probation was 3.8%. DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1979 & 1980 ANNUAL REPORTS, TABLE E-7.
16. One study has concluded that the incarceration cost in dollars to the government,
per offender, is ten times the cost of supervising an individual under a probation system.
TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 28. This 10 to 1 ratio does not include the additional cost
factors attributable to the money involved in the construction of prison facilities, govern-
ment aid to a prisoner's dependents, and the loss of tax dollars from the prisoner's income.
17. In 1975, there were 242,750 prisoners in state and federal prisons. U.S. DEP'T OF
JusTICE L.E.A.A., SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1977). In the same year,
there were 923,064 adults and 328,854 juveniles under probation supervision. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE L.E.A.A., SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1979).
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3751 (1976); ILL. Rhv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 1005-6-4 (1979).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976) provides:
As speedily as possible after arrest the probationer shall be taken before the court
for the district having jurisdiction over him. Thereupon the court may revoke the
probation and require him to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence,
and if imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence which
might originally have been imposed.
[Voi. 13
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sentences in excess of what would have been given had the defen-
dant not originally been placed on probation have been held
proper.20
Before 1973, judges revoked many probations and incarcerated
probationers without the benefit of a probation violation hearing.
In other instances, the probation revocation hearing constituted
summary proceedings at best, with very limited substantive and
procedural protections afforded the accused." Several theories
have attempted to justify withholding constitutional protection
from probationers.' Analysis of these theories reveals that they
were in fact "ignoble short-cuts" used to convict those charged
with violation of probation."3
See also Sims v. United States, 607 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Fried, 436
F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1971); Pearson v. State, 262 Ark. 513, 558 S.W.2d 149 (1977); People ex
rel. Gallagher v. Dist. Ct., 591 P.2d 1015 (Colo. 1978); James v. State, 340 So. 2d 537 (Fla.
1976); People v. Shockley, 54 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 370 N.E.2d 551 (1977); People v. Clayton, 51
Ill. App. 3d 682, 366 N.E.2d 386 (1977); People v. White, 51111. App. 3d 155, 366 N.E.2d 491
(1977).
20. See United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1977); People v. Guiterrex, 71 Ill.
App. 3d 537, 390 N.E.2d 25 (1979); People v. Mitchell, 53 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 369 N.E.2d 249
(1977); State v. Carter, 5 Kan. 2d 201, 614 P.2d 1007 (1980); People v. Olson, 98 Mich. App.
207, 296 N.W.2d 218 (1980); State v. McCue, 148 N.J. Super. 425, 372 A.2d 1127 (1977).
21. Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crm.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 175 (1964). The author sets out tables in this article detailing
state statutes that provided for no hearing at all for violations of probation and parole.
Other state statutes listed demonstrate the "summary" or "informal" nature of the revoca-
tion hearings then in existence.
22. Under the "identity of interest" theory, the defendant and the state were said to
have the same goal, i.e. rehabilitation, and hence judicial oversight was not required. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 n. 14 (1972). The "exhaustion of rights" theory rea-
soned that the defendant had exhausted all of his rights during the criminal trial and sen-
tence hearing. See Note, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 286-300 (1971). "The
act of grace" theory asserted that since the defendant did not have a right to probation,
such a sentence was an act of grace. Because no rights attached, no constitutional safeguards
had to be observed when what was given as grace was revoked. See Whitfield v. United
States, 401 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 1026 (1969); United States v.
Longknife, 258 F. Supp. 303, aff'd, 381 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1967); People v. Smith, 111 InI. App.
2d 283, 250 N.E.2d 178 (1969). The "contract" theory held that the defendant made an
agreement with the state when he accepted probation. That agreement estopped the proba-
tioner from complaining about any later violated rights. See United States v. Consuela-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975). Finally, the "in custody" theory assumed that
the probationer was in legal custody of the court and that he had no more rights than a
prisoner. Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937); Dillingham v. United States,
76 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1935).
23. In ruling that the exclusionary rule must be applied by the state courts, Justice
Clark stated that "the ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to a state tends to destroy
the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest."
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that the revocation of proba-
tion without a hearing denied due process.2 4 The Court reasoned
that probation, like parole, is a liberty of which termination could
be accomplished only if due consideration was given to the protec-
tions of the fourteenth amendment and to the "grievous loss suf-
fered" by the defendant.28 The Court ordered that a revocation
proceeding must provide for a two-tier system of constitutional
safeguards. First, a preliminary hearing must establish there is
probable cause to believe that a violation of probation has oc-
curred. The second step in the proceeding requires a formal hear-
ing to determine if an alternative to incarceration is feasible. With
respect to the formal revocation hearing, the Court held that the
defendant is entitled to:
(1) written notice of the claimed violation of probation;
(2) disclosure by the prosecution of the evidence against the
probationer;
(3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence;
(4) the right to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses;
(5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and
(6) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence re-
lied on and reasons for revoking probation."
These procedural elements constitute only the minimal constitu-
tional baseline for a probation revocation hearing. 7 Congress has
since affirmed these standards, adding only the requirement that
the probationer be represented by counsel in a federal probation
revocation hearing. 8
24. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Gagnon, a Wisconsin court had placed
the defendant on probation after his plea of guilty to the charge of armed robbery. While on
probation, the Deerfield, Illinois police arrested the defendant and a companion for bur-
glary. Defendant admitted his participation to the Illinois police officers, who forwarded the
information to the Wisconsin authorities. The state of Wisconsin, without a hearing, re-
voked the probation and sentenced defendant to 15 years in the state reformatory. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, following Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972),
which the year before had held that due process requires certain procedural safeguards in
parole revocation proceedings.
25. 408 U.S. at 482.
26. 411 U.S. at 786. The standards adopted by the Gagnon Court were first enunciated
in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
27. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 18-7.5, commentary at 526 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1980 STANDARDS].
28. In January 1981, Congress incorporated the Morrissey/Gagnon standards into FED.
R. CRiM. P. 32.1. The rule, which also provides for the right to be represented by counsel
states:
[Vol. 13
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's adoption of due process re-
quirements in probation revocation hearings has failed to create
uniform results in federal and state courts. Instead, the decisions
reflect uncertainty as to the exact rights of a probationer. Never-
theless, the judicial opinions do reveal an awareness by the courts
that the revocation hearing is, in fact, in the nature of a criminal
trial. For instance, although courts have applied several standards
of proof during revocation proceedings, all courts have ruled that
the burden of proof is on the state. 9 Moreover, most jurisdictions
(a) Revocation or Modification of Probation.
(1) Preliminary hearing. Whenever a probationer is held in custody on the ground
that he has violated a condition of his probation, he shall be afforded a prompt
hearing before any judge, or a United States magistrate who has been given au-
thority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 to conduct such hearings, in order to deter-
mine whether there is probable cause to hold the probationer for a revocation
hearing. The probationer shall be given
(A) notice of the preliminary hearing and its purpose and of the alleged
violation of probation;
(B) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence in his
own behalf;
(C) upon request, the opportunity to question witnesses against him un-
less, for good cause, the federal magistrate decides that justice does not
require the appearance of the witness; and
(D) notice of his right to be represented by counsel.
The proceedings shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording
device. If probable cause is found to exist, the probationer shall be held for a
revocation hearing. The probationer may be released pursuant to Rule 46(c)
pending the revocation hearing. If probable cause is not found to exist, the pro-
ceeding shall be dismissed.
(2) Revocation hearing. The revocation hearing, unless waived by the probationer,
shall be held within a reasonable time in the district of probation jurisdiction. The
probationer shall be given
(A) written notice of the alleged violation of probation;
(B) disclosure of the evidence against him;
(C) an opportunity to appear and to present evidence on his own behalf;
(D) the opportunity to question witnesses against him; and
(E) notice of his right to be represented by counsel.
(b) Modification of probation.
A hearing and assistance of counsel are required before the terms or conditions of
probation can be modified, unless the relief granted to the probationer upon his
request or the court's own motion is favorable to him.
29. In the federal courts, the standard of proof requires that the trial judge be "reasona-
bly satisfied" that a violation has been committed. See United States v. Smith, 571 F.2d 370
(7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Strada, 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Garza, 484 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jurgins, 465 F. Supp. 982 (W.D. Pa.
1979); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
In the state courts, many jurisdictions hold that a "preponderance of the evidence" is
necessary to revoke probation. See State v. Hadley, 114 Ariz. 86, 559 P.2d 206 (1977); Peo-
ple v. Hidalgo, 78 Cal. App. 3d 675, 144 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1978); People v. Miller, 77 Mich.
App. 381, 258 N.W.2d 235 (1977); Wallace v. State, 562 P.2d 1175 (Okla. 1977); State v.
380 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 13
will not allow a conviction of violation of probation to rest on hear-
say evidence.30 Other cases demonstrate that courts recognize com-
mon threads running through a criminal trial and a probation rev-
ocation proceeding. Although the Supreme Court did not mandate
an absolute right to counsel during the probation revocation pro-
ceeding, but instead adopted an ad hoc approach providing that
counsel should be appointed when the defendant denies the
charges and requests counsel, 1 the recent trend of case law re-
quires representation by counsel during the hearing as a matter or
right.52 Due process requirements further include written notice of
Serio, 168 N.J. Super. 394, 403 A.2d 49 (1979); State v. Bunkman, 281 N.W.2d 442 (S.D.
1979); Cross v. State, 586 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1979). Illinois, by case law, insists that the evi-
dence be "clear and convincing." See People v. Seymour, 53 Il. App. 3d 367, 368 N.E.2d
1018 (1977). However, an Illinois statute provides that the state may prove the violation by
a "preponderance of the evidence." ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 1005-6-4(C) (1981). Georgia
accepts "slight evidence" as the standard. See Thomas v. State, 143 Ga. App. 521, 239
S.E.2d 205 (1977); Hunter v. State, 139 Ga. App. 676, 220 S.E.2d 505 (1976). Alabama and
Rhode Island adopt the "reasonable satisfaction" test of the federal courts. See Thompson
v. State, 356 So. 2d 757 (Ala. 1978); Wright v. State, 349 So. 2d 124 (Ala. 1977); State v.
Studman, 402 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 1979); State v. Turcotte, 400 A.2d 957 (R.I. 1979). Colorado
requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" if the claimed violation is the commission of
another crime. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-206(3) (1978). See In re C.B., 196 Colo. 362, 585
P.2d 281 (1978).
30. The Federal Rules of Evidence define "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. Evm. 801(c). Most courts prohibit the use of
hearsay evidence against an accused during probation revocation proceedings. See United
States v. Smith, 571 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1978); People v. Wilson, 44 II. App. 3d 15, 357
N.E.2d 842 (1976); People v. Givens, 82 Mich. App. 336, 266 N.W.2d 815 (1978); Meyer v.
State, 596 P.2d 1270 (Okla. 1979); State v. DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1978); Maden v.
State, 542 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1976). Some courts admit this type of evidence, but require that
it be "reliable" hearsay. See United States v. Burkhalter, 588 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Pattman, 535 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Joaquin, 88 Cal. App. 3d 80,
151 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1979). A minority of jurisdictions hold that hearsay evidence is sufficient
for revocation. See State v. Lovell, 123 Ariz. 482, 600 P.2d 1114 (1978); State v. Baines, 40
N.C. App. 545, 253 S.E.2d 300 (1979); Commonwealth v. Reggis, 264 Pa. Super. 427, 399
A.2d 1125 (1979).
31. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
32. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978); People v. Baker, 62 Ill. 2d
57, 338 N.E.2d 385 (1975); State v. Bryan, 284 Md. 152, 395 A.2d 475 (1978). Contra Nally
v. State, 147 Ga. 634, 239 S.E.2d 685 (1978).
The Federal Rules also prescribe notice of the right to be represented by counsel at the
hearing. FaD. R. Cram. P. 32(a)(1)(1), (2)(E). Similarly, Illinois requires that the probationer
be addressed in open court to determine if he understands the purpose of the revocation
proceeding, the nature of the violation and the condition on which it is based; that he has a
right of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel, and if he is indi-
gent, that he has a right to appointed counsel. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 110A, I 401(1)(a) (1981).
See People v. Barker, 62 I1. 2d 57, 338 N.E.2d 385 (1975).
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the claimed violation of probation prior to the hearing.83
Courts have also held the privilege against self-incrimination to
be applicable to revocation proceedings." Moreover, judges refuse
to admit involuntary confessions during revocation proceedings. 86
Violations of Miranda,"0 however, will not bar the use of an other-
wise voluntary statement.87 Both federal and state courts reject the
right to trial by jury as a necessary procedure in a revocation hear-
ing." Federal courts also refuse to apply traditional speedy trial
provisions to revocation hearings,39 but such provisions are strictly
observed in a state such as Illinois, which protects the speedy trial
right by statute.40  The same state, however, severely restricts the
discovery devices available to an accused probationer despite
United States Supreme Court precedent which indicates a greater
scope of discovery should be allowed in probation revocation pro-
ceedings than is allowed in Illinois."
33. In United States v. Davila, 573 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1978), a defendant who was placed
on probation for heroin distribution did not receive a written petition which specified the
grounds on which the government sought to revoke his probation until the day of the hear-
ing on the violation. The Seventh Circuit ruled that he was denied due process of law, even
though he was informed at his initial court appearance, almost two weeks before the hear-
ing, of the grounds on which the government sought to revoke his probation.
34. United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Peterson, 74 Ill. 2d
478, 384 N.E.2d 348 (1979).
35. People v. Knight, 75 Ill. 2d 291, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979); People v. Bell, 50 InI. App. 3d
82, 365 N.E.2d 203 (1977).
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
37. People v. Peterson, 74 Ill. 2d 478, 384 N.E.2d 348 (1979). See, e.g., United States v.
MacKenzie, 601 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Lassai, 366 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1978); People
v. Ferguson, 395 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1977); State v. Magby, 92 Nev. 526, 554 P.2d.1274 (1976).
The reasons advanced for admitting a statement taken in violation of the Miranda deci-
sion are the same as those advanced for not applying the exclusionary rule to the probation
revocation proceeding in search and seizure cases. See People v. Redmond, 85 Il. App. 3d
599, 407 N.E.2d 132 (1980), where the court rejected a motion to suppress eyewitness identi-
fication, due to suggestive line-up procedures employed by the police. The court reasoned
that evidence obtained in technical violation of constitutional rights can be introduced at
the probation revocation hearing. Little attention is paid by the courts to the fact that
violations of Miranda may affect the reliability of the statements, whereas violations of
fourth amendment rights do not similarly affect the reliability of the seized evidence.
38. See United States v. Nagelberg, 413 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Dupree, 18 II.
App. 3d 495, 309 N.E.2d 721 (1974).
39. See United States v. Jackson, 590 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1979); Kartman *v. Parrott, 535
F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1976).
40. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1 1005-6-4(b) (1981).
41. See People v. Dewitt, 78 Ill. 2d 82, 397 N.E.2d 1385 (1979).
42. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).
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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Without question, the fourth amendment to the Constitution 8
protects the probationer from unreasonable searches and
seizures."' The exclusionary rule, which prevents evidence obtained
43. U.S. Const. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The judiciary has developed a great body of constitutional law through a case-by-case adju-
dication of controversies over the meaning of the fourth amendment provisions. D. MEADOR,
PRELUDES TO GIDEON 9 (1967). Elementary fourth amendment law, gleaned from a reading
of the United States Supreme Court decisions, provides that all searches and seizures per-
formed without a warrant are per se unconstitutional unless: (1) the fact situation makes the
fourth amendment inapplicable; or (2) the fact situation fits into one of the "few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions" as defined by the United States Supreme Court.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
44. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). Although the
fourth amendment applies to a probationer in the same manner that it applies to one not on
probation, the amendment is not applicable to all searches.
For instance, the Supreme Court has held the fourth amendment inapplicable when the
search or seizure was conducted not in the home or office but upon open land. See Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924) wherein Justice Holmes said: "[the] special protec-
tion accorded by the fourth amendment to the people in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house
is as old as the Common Law." Id. at 58-59. This is true even though the officer may be
trespassing on the accused's land. See Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). But see Fulbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th
Cir. 1968) and Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966) (area of a farm
protected by the fourth amendment includes not only house but also the "curtilage," i.e.,
the immediate surrounding area of yards, barns, outbuildings, etc.). Property which one has
abandoned, such as items put in a garbage can, also falls outside the protection of the fourth
amendment. See Able v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). Courts have also denied fourth
amendment protection to search and seizures performed by certain classes of persons. See
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (non-governmental agents); J.M.A. v. Alaska, 542
P.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975) (relatives); People v. Heffin, 71 Ill. 2d 525, 376 N.E.2d 1367 (1978)
(relatives); People v. Hamilton, 74 I1. 2d 457, 386 N.E.2d 53 (1979) (hospital employees);
Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974) (school authorities);
People v. Toliver, 60 Ill. App. 3d. 650, 377 N.E.2d 207 (1978) detective agencies.
Moreover, one who lacks "standing" cannot claim applicability of the fourth amendment.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971). See Cole, The Exclusionary Rule
in Probation and Parole Revocation Proceedings: Some Observations on Deterrence and
the "Imperative of Judicial Integrity," 52 CHI. KENT L. REv. 21 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Cole]; Note, The Exclusionary Rule and Probation Revocation Proceedings, 11 VAL. U.L.
REV. 1149 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exclusionary Rule]. For many years, the law
relative to standing was that as outlined in the 1960 Supreme Court decision of Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). One had standing if he had a possessory or ownerhip
interest in the place searched or in the property seized, or if he was legitimately on the
premises when the search occurred. Jones also accorded automatic standing to one charged
with criminal possession. Seven years later in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
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in violation of this amendment from being admitted in court, rep-
(1967), the Court adhered to the general rule of Jones that fourth amendment rights are
personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted. The Court expressed the belief that
the deterrent values of the rule are served by limiting applications of the rule only to those
whose rights the police have violated.
In 1978, the Supreme Court again took up the issue of standing in Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978). Rakas defined standing not in terms of possessory interests as in Jones, but
in terms of whether the search infringed upon the defendant's legitimate expectation of
privacy in the things seized or the place searched. Two years after Rakas the Supreme
Court ruled on the issue of standing in three other cases. In United States v. Salvucci, 448
U.S. 83 (1980), the Court rejected the automatic standing rule of Jones for those charged
with a crime of possession. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the Court held that
the ownership of property alone did not create a legitimate expectation of privacy. In the
third case, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), the Court held that even if the
government's conduct consisted of a flagrant abuse of the Constitution, only one whose own
fourth amendment rights had been violated would have standing.
It has been suggested that the Payner decision stands as evidence that the Court will not
give standing to one other than the victim of the unlawful search because the deterrent aim
of the exclusionary rule is not served. Lauer, Fourth Amendment-The Court Further Lim-
its Standing, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567 (1980). However, Payner more clearly sug-
gests that the exclusionary rule and its purposes are not at issue in a standing case. In
Payner, the government hired a woman to seduce a banker, paid to have the banker's brief-
case stolen by another person, and then participated in breaking into the case and removing
its contents. Evidence obtained from the locked briefcase was later used in a tax evasion
trial, not against the banker but against one of the bank's customers, whose records were
found in the briefcase. This "conscience shocking" conduct of the government was not con-
demned by the Supreme Court, because it was said that the bank customer had no standing
as he was not the victim of the government's illegality. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (even though the fourth amendment was not generally available at the time the case
was decided, the Supreme Court carved out an exception due to the abusive police conduct
involved in pumping the accused's stomach to obtain evidence (pills) of a crime. The Court
stated that the police conduct so abused individual liberty as to "shock the conscience of
civilized society.") Id. at 172.
For the Payner Court to condone such police conduct by asserting that the defendant has
no standing proves that the standing limitation cannot be based on the deterrent aim of the
exclusionary rule. The standing limitation is inconsistent with both of the asserted reasons
for the exclusionary rule, the imperative of judicial integrity and the deterrence of police
misconduct. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH.
L. REV. 665, 734 (1970). The Payner case can only be explained by the fact that the fourth
amendment historically has not been applied to one whose fourth amendment rights have
not been violated. The common law recognized that rights such as those conferred by the
fourth amendment are not bestowed vicariously. Consider the language of Semayne's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603):
[T]he house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself and shall not
extend to protect any person who flies to his house, or the goods of any other
which are brought and conveyed into his house, to prevent a lawful execution, and
to escape the ordinary process of law; for the privilege of his house extends only to
him and his family, and to his own proper goods.
Id. at 198. Semayne's Case is cited in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
Even where the fourth amendment applies, the United States Supreme Court has carved
out certain exceptions to the amendment's warrant requirement, thus allowing an officer to
lawfully conduct a search or seizure without prior judicial approval. First, a search incident
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resents the principal remedy available to those whose fourth
amendment rights have been violated.45 Whether the exclusionary
to the valid arrest of an individual does not require a warrant. Assuming that the arrest
itself is based on probable cause, an officer may search the arrestee and the area under his
immediate control. Such a limited search protects the officer from harm and keeps the ac-
cused from destroying evidence of the crime. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Nor does a valid "stop and frisk," where an officer stops a person on the street and pats
him down for weapons, require a search warrant. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In order
to perform a "stop and frisk," the officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that (1)
criminal activity is afoot, and (2) the offender is armed and dangerous. Under such circum-
stances, the officer may stop the offender and pat down his outer clothing to look for weap-
ons. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
The "doctrine of fresh pursuit" has emerged as another exception of the warrant require-
ment, allowing an officer faced with exigent circumstances, such as an armed and fleeing
suspect or a screaming victim, to enter and conduct searches which, under normal condi-
tions, would not be allowed in the absence of a warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
The Supreme Court further recognizes warrantless searches when the defendant consents
to a search or where someone with equal authority over, or interest in, the premises freely
and voluntarily consents to a search. The standard of voluntariness turns on the totality of
the circumstances existing at the time of the search. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411 (1976); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973).
A government agent may also search an auto without a search warrant if the car is mova-
ble and the agent has probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime.
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1973); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
A government agent may also search an auto without a search warrant if the car is mova-
ble and the agent has probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime.
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Pres-
ton v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In
recent years the judiciary has extended the "automobile exception" to allow an inventory
search of an arrested person's car without a warrant. The justification for the inventory
search is that the officer is protecting the owner's property or protecting himself from later
claims of lost or mislaid property. See South Dakota v. Operman, 428 U.S. 374 (1976);
Caddy v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
Finally, the "plain view doctrine" constitues a broad exception to the warrant require-
ment. Under this exception, an officer may, if he is lawfully present on the premises, seize
items which inadvertently come into his view if such items have the appearance of criminal
evidence. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S 443 (1971); Fraizer v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
(1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
The Supreme Court jealously guards these well-defined exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The burden rests on the govern-
ment to prove that a search or seizure performed outside the judicial process falls within
one of the carefully defined exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474
(1971).
45. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The exclusionary rule extends to all evidence
that is the fruit of constitutional illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
A person invokes the exclusionary rule by presenting to the court a motion to suppress the
evidence. In the federal system, motions to suppress evidence must be filed before the date
for trial set by the court. FED. R. Caium. P. 12(b), (c).
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rule is available to a probationer in a probation revocation hearing
remains, as yet, unresolved.
The exclusionary rule applies to four types of constitutional vio-
lations: searches and seizures contrary to the fourth amendment;46
confessions, admissions, or statements taken in violation of the
fifth and sixth amendments; 47 identification testimony resulting
from suggestive police practices at a line-up or showup; 5 and evi-
dence obtained by methods that would "shock the conscience" of
the court.49 The last three situations should be distinguished from
search and seizure cases, because the reliability of the evidence in
the last three cases may be in doubt as a result of the police
practices.50
The exclusionary rule originally applied only to federal courts.51
The Supreme Court reasoned that the states could continue to ad-
mit illegally obtained evidence, because the principles of federal-
ism would be better served if the states were not required to use
the exclusionary rule, so long as a state would rely upon some
other "equally effective" method which would be "consistently en-
forced."5 Eventually, however, the Supreme Court recognized that
there were no methods as effective as the exclusionary rule and
that, in fact, most of the states had done nothing to protect against
violations of fourth amendment rights.s Thus, the Court held
that as a matter of due process, evidence obtained by a search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment would be inadmissi-
46. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
48. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
49. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See supra note 45.
50. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 479 (1976). These four types of constitutional viola-
tions are discussed in Oaks, supra note 44, at 665.
51. The Supreme Court first announced the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). Although thirty years earlier in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886), the Court in dictum hinted that illegally seized evidence might be inadmissible at
trial, the Weeks Court expressly ruled that a defendant could move for return of property
which was wrongfully seized by federal authorities. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921), the Supreme Court extended Weeks to preclude unconstitutionally seized evidence
from introduction at a federal criminal trial.
52. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949). Justice Frankfurter stated that "the secur-
ity of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty and as such enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause."
Id. at 27-28.
53. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961).
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ble in a state court as it was in a federal court." The Court ex-
pressed the belief that the exclusionary rule was integrated with
the constitutional right to privacy and comprised an essential in-
gredient of the fourth and fourteenth amendments."
The Supreme Court has since emphasized the necessity of the
exclusionary rule, articulating the twofold policies underlying the
rule: first, the deterrence of unlawful police conduct, and second,
the preservation of judicial integrity." The deterrent aim of the
exclusionary rule lies in removing the incentive to disregard consti-
tutional mandates.57 If a law enforcement officer knows that ille-
gally obtained evidence cannot be used to convict, then presuma-
bly the officer will have no reason to act illegally in gathering
evidence. The exclusionary rule is the only effective deterrent to
police misconduct in the area of the violation of citizens' constitu-
tional rights. Without the rule, the guarantee against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures would be a mere "form of words," "value-
less and undeserving of mention."" The "imperative of judicial
integrity" is a recognition that if the courts do not forbid the use
of unlawfully seized evidence, they become accomplices in disobe-
dience of the law." The imperative of judicial integrity and the
54. In Mapp, Justice Clark stated:
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right to
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our
books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by the official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to
all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We
hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Consti-
tution is by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.
Id. at 654-55.
55. Id. at 656-57. Contrary to the majority opinion, Justice Black in his concurrence
stated that "the Federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but
is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congess might negate." Id. at 661 (Black, J.,
concurring). Justice Black's view is now in accord with the majority opinion of the present
Court. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). However, Justice Brennan still
holds to the philosophy that the rule is an essential ingredient of the fourth amendment.
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502-35 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
57. "The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter-to compel respect for the consti-
tutional guarantee in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
58. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
59. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). Justices Brandeis and Holmes had
addressed this value of judicial integrity in their dissenting comments in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):
In a government of laws existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the patient, the omnipresent
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police deterrent aims have been considered almost equally impor-
tant rationales supporting the application of the exclusionary
rule.60
However, two developments have dampened enthusiasm for the
exclusionary rule. Since the 1960's, crime and the fear of crime in-
creasingly rank among the greatest concerns of American society."'
During this same time, the composition of the Supreme Court has
changed, resulting in a new attitude toward the administration of
criminal justice.6" Recent decisions of the Court involving the
fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule reflect society's atti-
tude. A majority of the Court, particularly the Chief Justice, now
view the exclusionary remedy as an impediment in the criminal
law context."3 Against such a backdrop, the Court has shifted the
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes a law breaker it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means--to de-
clare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of
a private criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-
trine this court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In this regard, Justice Holmes declared that "no dis-
tinction can be taken between the government as prosecutor and the government as judge."
Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accord McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
60. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in the same paragraph, the Court recognized the
deterrent theory as the "major thrust" of the rule and referred to the "imperative of judicial
integrity" as its "vital function." Id. at 12.
61. Chief Justice Warren Burger has said: "Crime and the fear of crime have permeated
the fabric of American life, damaging the poor and minorities even more than the affluent. A
recent survey indicated 46% of women and 48% of negroes are significantly frightened by
pervasive crime in America." Address by Warren Burger, Annual Report to the ABA, in
Houston, Texas (Feb. 1981).
62. The late Justice Douglas noted:
The Court does move with political trends, as the philosophy of newly appointed
Justices reflects a trend and community attutudes are not without their effect.
The Court is not isolated from life. Its members are very much a part of the com-
munity and knows the fears, anxieties, cravings and wishes of their neighbors.
That does not mean that community attitudes are necessarily translated by mys-
terious osmosis into new judicial doctrine. It does mean that the state of public
opinion will often make the court cautious when it should be bold.
W.O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975-AUToBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 38
(1980). See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Can-
dor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971).
63. During his remarks to the American Bar Association in February 1981, Chief Justice
Burger stated that "the search for 'perfect' justice has led us on a cause found nowhere else
in the world . . . Our search for true justice must not be twisted into an endless quest for
technical errors unrelated to guilt or innocence." Address by Warren Burger, Annual Re-
port to the ABA, in Houston, Texas (Feb. 1981).
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Chief Justice referred
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philosophy behind the rule, emphasizing its deterrence value and
relegating the judicial integrity theory to secondary status.64 Still,
the purposes of the exclusionary rule continue to be a hotly de-
bated issue."'
The Supreme Court now evaluates application of the exclusion-
ary rule primarily by appraising its efficiency in deterring police
to the rule as an "anamolous and ineffective mechanism with which to regulate law enforce-
ment." Id. at 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). At that time, however, the Chief Justice did not
advocate abandonment of the rule until a meaningful alternative could be developed. Id.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). But in 1976, in his concurring opinion in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), even though a meaningful alternative had not yet been developed, he suggested
that the rule be abolished because it "exact(s) such exorbitant costs from society purely on
the basis of speculative and unsubstantiated evidence." Id. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
64. As Justice Powell explained in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), "while courts, of
course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process, this
concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."
Id. at 485. The primary justification "for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of
police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 486.
65. The exclusionary rule is not without its critics, both on and off the bench. See, e.g.,
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1 (1964); Kaplan, The Limits of
the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974); Oaks, supra note 44, at 756. Yet, "the
disadvantages of which the rule does entail are worth the price which must be paid." Paul-
sen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE Sci. 255 (1961). Monrad Paulsen explained:
[T]he exclusionary evidence rule is morally correct and appropriate to a free soci-
ety. It is a rule naturally suggested by the Constitution itself. It insures that the
issues respecting defendant's rights are raised and litigated frequently without
great inconvenience. It is the most effective remedy we possess to deter police
lawlessness.
Id. at 257. Alternative remedies have been suggested to replace the exclusionary rule. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (tort remedy); Kaplan, Limits of Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027 (1974) (in-
tra-police department censure, or removal of the rule in serious cases).
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the details of such other devices, or the pros
and cons of the rule itself. For that matter, suffice it to say that none of the alternatives
had had any proven success or even acceptance by Congress or the courts. See Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Dellinger, Of Rights
and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAsv. L. REv. 1532 (1972). The reasons for
the continued vitality and application of the exclusionary rule for the protection of constitu-
tional rights is well stated by one of its more severe critics, Dallin H. Oaks, who states that
constitutional rights will only be honored if the violation of such rights is punished. In
addition, Oaks explained:
The advantage of the exclusionary rule entirely apart from any direct deterrent
effect is that it provides an occasion for judicial review, and it gives credibility to
the constitutional guarantees. By demonstrating that society will attach serious
consequences to the violation of constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule in-
vokes and magnifies the moral and educative force of the law. Over the long term
this may integrate some Fourth Amendment ideals into the value system or norms
of behavior of law enforcement agencies.
Oaks, supra note 44, at 756.
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misconduct.66 This approach turns on a judicially created two-
prong balancing test: first, whether the extension of the rule in a
given context produces any deterrent benefit; and second, assum-
ing that application of the rule has recognizable deterrent value,
whether the potential benefits outweigh the potential injury to the
function of the proceedings in which the evidence is sought to be
admitted. 8 This balancing test has created broad new exceptions
to the exclusionary rule,6e particularly when the rule is sought to
be extended beyond its traditional application to the government's
66. Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 Cam. L. BULL. 5 (1979).
67. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), often cited as a case exemplifying
the balancing test, the defense urged that the exclusionary rule should be extended to grand
jury proceedings in which the government sought to introduce illegally seized evidence. The
Court, rejecting this broad application, reasoned:
[DJespite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been inter-
preted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against
all persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been re-
stricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.
Id. at 348. In deciding whether the remedial purpose of the exclusionary rule mandated
extension of the rule to grand jury proceedings, the Court articulated a balancing test which
weighed the potential injury to the grand jury against the potential benefits of applying the
rule. After finding that application of the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedings would
unduly interfere with the grand jury's duties, the Court characterized the benefits to be
derived from extension of the rule as uncertain at best. The Court explained:
Such an extension would deter only police investigation consciously directed to-
ward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand jury investigation. The
incentive to disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment solely to obtain
an indictment from a grand jury is substantially negated by the inadmissibility of
the illegally seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the search
victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment
where a conviction could not be obtained. We therefore decline to embrace a view
that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly minimal advance in deterrence
of police misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the
grand jury.
Id. at 351-52. Thus, the Calandra Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to grand
jury proceedings, because under the balancing test the resulting injuries outweighed the pos-
sible benefits.
68. Wheatley, Criminal Law-Exclusionary Rule-Refusal to Extend Rule to Probation
Revocation Hearings, BREV. HILLs B.J. 38 (1977).
69. The Court has refused to extend the exclusionary rule to the following situations:
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (search pursuant to later-declared invalid search
warrant); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (search in violation of IRS regula-
tions); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (nonvictim search-no standing); United States
v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (attenuation between illegal search and witness testimony);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus proceedings); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (federal tax case, search by state police "in good faith" reliance
on defective search warrant); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (retroactive appli-
cation of a Supreme Court decision); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (a missing
Miranda warning before date of Miranda decision).
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case in chief"0 to proceedings such as probation revocation
hearings.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS
Deterrence
Employing the balancing test, courts7' generally have found
70. The exclusionary rule only applies to the government's affirmative use of illegally
seized evidence. In Walter v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), it was held that such evi-
dence could be used against a defendant who took the witness stand in his own behalf and
would commit perjury. The court declared:
It is one thing to say that the government cannot make an affirmative use of evi-
dence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can turn
the illegal method by which evidence in the government's possession was obtained
to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction and
untruths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the
Fourth Amendment.
See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)
(statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach a defendant who testi-
fied). Accord United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
71. The majority of federal and state courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule
at a revocation hearing. See United States v. Larrios, 640 F.2d 938 (1981); United States v.
Basso, 632 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vanderwork,
522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1975); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th
Cir. 1975) United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Johnson,
455 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1979), af'd, 438 F.2d 1027
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971); Connelly v. Parkinson, 405 F. Supp. 811 (D.
S.D. 1975); United States v. Delago, 397 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v.
Rushlow, 385 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D.
Cal. 1972); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 623 P.2d 8 (1980); Harris v. State, 606 S.W.2d 93
(Ark. 1980); People v. Rafter, 41 Cal. App. 3d 557, 116 Cal. Rtr. 281 (1974); People v. Calais,
37 Cal. App. 3d 898, 112 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1974); People v. Hayko, 7 Cal. App. 3d 604, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1970); People v. Vanella, 265 Cal. App. 2d 463, 71 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1968); People v.
Ressin, 620 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1981); People v. Wilderson, 189 Colo. 448, 541 P.2d 896 (1975);
People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76, 525 P.2d 461 (1974); Reeves v. State, 366 So. 2d 874 (Fla.
1979); Lathan v. State, 360 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1978); Bruno v. State, 343 So. 2d 1335 (Fla.
1977); Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1974); Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490
(Fla. 1974); State ex rel. Ard v. Shelby, 97 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1957); Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682,
32 So. 2d 607 (1947); People v. Knight, 75 Ill. 2d 291, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979); People v.
Woodall, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 358 N.E.2d 1267 (1977); People v. Swanks, 34 Ill. App. 3d 794,
339 N.E.2d 469 (1975); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682, aff'd, 62 Ill.
2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1974); Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 346 N.E.2d 746 (1976);
State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69 (La. 1979); State v. Foisy, 384 A.2d 42 (Me. 1978); State v.
Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975); State v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692 (1974);
Lemore v. Bouchard, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973); State v. White, 264 N.C. 600, 142
S.E.2d 153 (1965); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1972); State v. Nettles, 287 Or.
136, 597 P.2d 1243 (1979); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); State
v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094 (R.I. 1978); State v. Knowles, 474 P.2d 727 (Utah 1970), State v.
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that the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does not re-
quire application of the exclusionary rule in a probation revocation
hearing.72 Primarily, the courts focus on whether application of the
rule would have any deterrent effect on police misconduct. Deter-
rence is effectuated in two modes: deterring the individual officers
involved in the particular unlawful search, 7s and instilling fourth
amendment ideals and norms of behavior into the value systems of
all law enforcement agencies.7 14 The two most common fact situa-
tions in which the courts refuse to apply the exclusionary rule in
the revocation process thwart both of these deterrent aims.
The first situation, which could be referred to as the "previously
suppressed evidence" case, involves the following typical fact pat-
tern:7 5 robbery probationer, walking on a public sidewalk at 3:30
p.m. in the company of "Junkie Jim," is carrying a large bundle
covered by a blanket or sheet. A Chicago police officer stops the
probationer. The subsequent arrest and search, conducted without
a warrant or probable cause to believe that the probationer had
committed a crime, reveals stolen merchandise. At the trial for
burglary, the trial court, after hearing the officer's testimony,
Proctor, 16 Wash. App. 866, 559 P.2d 1363 (1978); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 516
P.2d 1088 (1974); State v. Kuhn, 499 P.2d 49, aff'd, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972).
A minority of jurisdictions hold that the exclusionary rule is as applicable in a probation
revocation proceeding as it is at a criminal trial. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d
1205 (4th Cir. 1978); Owens v. State, 153 Ga. App. 525, 265 S.E.2d 856 (1980); Adams v.
State, 153 Ga. App. 41, 264 S.E.2d 532 (1980); Giles v. State, 149 Ga. App. 263, 254 S.E.2d
154 (1979); Austin v. State, 148 Ga. App. 755, 252 S.E.2d 664 (1979); Michaud v. State, 505
P.2d 1399 (Okla. Crim. 1973); May v. State, 582 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Crim. 1979); Jones v.
State, 567 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Crim. 1978); Tamez v. State, 534 S.W. 2d 686 (Tex. Crim.
1976); Rushing v. State, 500 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. 1973).
72. The leading case adopting this viewpoint is United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1975).
The [exclusionary] rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons [citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348]. Thus, we must first determine whether extension of
the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings would produce any deter-
rent benefits. If none can be expected from extension of the rule, or if the benefits
are insignificant, then the exclusion of the seized evidence is unwarranted. How-
ever, even if the extension of the rule may in fact achieve some deterrence of
police misconduct, we must still balance the potential benefits against potential
injury to the function of the proceedings in which the illegally obtained evidence
is to be admitted or used. If the potential harm substantially outweighs potential
benefits, then the rule should not be extended.
Id. at 53-54.
73. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 43 (1978).
74. Oaks, supra note 44, at 756.
75. These facts parallel People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975).
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grants the probationer's motion to suppress the evidence. Frus-
trated in its burglary prosecution, the state thereafter files a peti-
tion to revoke probation. At the probation revocation hearing, the
same officer, over the probationer's objection, reiterates his testi-
mony, and the state makes affirmative use of the previously sup-
pressed physical evidence. After a sentencing hearing in aggrava-
tion and mitigation, the court revokes probation and hands down a
sentence of two to four years in the state penitentiary. The judg-
ment and sentence of the trial court are affirmed on appeal.
The second situation, known as the "alternative prosecution"
case, occurs under circumstances in which the state, knowing that
its police officers have made an unlawful search, will abandon a
doubtful criminal prosecution. The state then uses the fruits of the
unlawful search in an independent prosecution for violation of an
old probation sentence, where the tainted evidence will be admit-
ted.7 6 This situation results in revocation of the probation and im-
position of a prison sentence based upon criminal charges on which
the probationer has never been tried."
Use of tainted evidence in the "previously suppressed evidence"
and the "alternative prosecution" cases are counterproductive of
proper prosecutorial conduct 78 and of the efforts made in police
education over the past twenty years, which have produced a high
degree of professionalism in law enforcement agencies in our coun-
try. 7 9 The inescapable conclusion is that the application of the ex-
76. See United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissenting). See also R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING, THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 154 (1969)
(when the prosecutor lacks confidence in the convictability of a defendant, he often tries to
persuade the probation officer to initiate revocation proceedings).
77. This incongruity was demonstrated during oral arguments before the United States
Supreme Court in Mepa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967):
Mr. Justice Fortas asked if it was true that. . . [one of the petitioners] had never
actually been tried in connection with the criminal charges that led to revocation
of his probation, and thus to his imprisonment. This was true, replied. . . [coun-
sel for the petitioners]. Mr. Justice Fortas then commented that this must make
for efficient administration of justice. "Very efficient administration," replied...
[counsel].
36 U.S.L.W. 3153-54 (U.S. 1967).
78. As stated by Justice Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), "only by exclu-
sion can we impress upon zealous prosecutors that violation of the constitution will do him
no good. Only when that point is driven home can the prosecutor be expected to emphasize
the importance of observing constitutional demands in his instructions to the police." Id. at
44 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
79. Yale Kamisar reports on the findings of an amicus brief filed with the Supreme
Court by the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement and the International Association of
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clusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings produces a
great deal of deterrent benefit.
Although it has been assumed arguendo that the use of the rule
in the revocation process would have some deterrent benefits, 80 the
majority of jurisdictions, when responding to the second prong of
the balancing test, find that the benefits that would be obtained
from such an application of the rule are outweighed by a strong
public interest in incarcerating convicted offenders who have vio-
lated the terms of their probation.8 Although society does have an
interest in incarcerating an offender who has committed a serious
violation of his probation, the same interest prevails with any ma-
jor criminal in whose criminal prosecution the exclusionary rule is
invoked.8 2 The argument that society has a greater interest in pro-
tecting itself against a recidivist probationer appears illogical, since
courts are willing to apply the rule to an ex-convict who is not a
probationer. 83 In fact, recent studies indicate that claims that the
Chiefs of Police. According to the brief, a survey of warrantless search and seizure cases
decided by appellate courts nationwide during the 27 month period from January 1970
through March 1972 revealed that 84%, or 1,157 of 1,371 such searches studied, were found
to be proper. The brief concludes:
this excellent record of successful police compliance with the rule of search and
seizure is attributed to police professionalism-an attempt by most police to learn
at least in a general way the restrictions on their search and seizure activities and
a good faith desire to comport themselves properly within such restrictions.
Professor Kamisar's comment thereon is: "[blut what stimulated the attempt to most of-
ficers to familiarize themselves, at least in a general way, with the law of search and seizure?
Perhaps, just perhaps, it was the exclusionary rule." 15 CRiM. L. BULL. 5 (1979). In Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court noted that recruit training programs and in-service
courses in fourth amendment law were provided by states that had adopted the exclusionary
rule, whereas states that did not follow the rule offered little or no such education. Id. at 44-
45. The effect of the rule is seen today in Chicago, where search and seizure courses are
mandatory in recruit training schools. In that city, recent Supreme Court decisions on
search and seizure are briefed by the Superintendent of Police, Richard Brzecek, and are
forwarded to all departments in the form of a "general order." Letter from Richard Brecek,
Supt. of Police, City of Chicago, to author (March 1981).
80. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 55; In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970);
People v. Dowery, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); Note, The Exclusionary Rule,
supra note 44, at 147.
82. The Supreme Court was aware of this when it announced the exclusionary rule in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), yet it was considered worth the price.
Note, Striking the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amendment
and Parole and Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers, 51 N.Y.U. L. REy.
800 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Striking the Balance].
83. See Note, Illegally Seized Evidence is Admissible at a Parole Revocation Hearing,
45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1111, 1114 (1970).
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exclusionary rule frees criminals are greatly exaggerated.8 4
Courts further argue that use of the exclusionary rule during the
probation hearing will make the proceedings adversary and formal,
to the detriment of the rehabilitative objective of probation."5
However, the revocation hearing represents an adjudicative pro-
ceeding wherein incarceration is the likely result of an adverse
finding. The adversarial and formal nature injected into the hear-
ing by the exclusionary rule would not create any more or less sig-
nificant effect than does application of the rule in any other adju-
dicative hearing, most notably the criminal trial.88
It is also alleged that correction officers would have to devote
precious time to personally gather admissible proof against proba-
tioners who will not accept rehabilitation, and that the exclusion of
evidence in the revocation proceeding would deprive the correc-
tions system of important evidence for rehabilitation.8 7 These ar-
guments fail to account for the fact that judicial enforcement of
almost all constitutional rights occurs in an adversary setting and
84. Wayne R. LaFave, in his text on search and seizure, reports the results of a study of
motions to suppress evidence in the federal courts conducted by the Comptroller General in
1979:
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the "cost" of the exclusionary rule, in
terms of acquittals or dismissed cases, is much lower than is commonly assumed.
In Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions (Report of
the Comptroller General, April 19, 1979) an empirical study of cases handled in 38
U.S. Attorneys offices from July 1-August 31, 1978, it was found that of 2,804
charged defendants only 30% involved a search or seizure and only 11% filed a
motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds. These motions were denied in
the overwhelming majority of cases, so that in only 1.3% of the 2,804 defendant
cases was evidence excluded as a result of a Fourth Amendment suppression mo-
tion. Moreover, over half of the defendants whose motions were granted in total or
in part, were convicted nonetheless. As for the cases during the sample period
which the U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute, in only 0.4% of them was a search
and seizure problem the primary reason.
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIzuaR 1 n.9 (1981).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Rushlow, 385 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1974); United States
v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
86. As described in United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978):
Consideration of the nature of a probation revocation hearing leads to the conclu-
sion that the application of the exclusionary rule will result in approximately the
same potential for injury and benefit as its application in other criminal adjudica-
tive proceedings. The rule's exclusion of some of the evidence about the new
charges which form the basis of the complaint about the probationer, the delay
incident to suppression hearings, and the rule's effectiveness in deterring future
unconstitutional searches are neither significantly more nor less than in other such
adjudicative proceedings.
Id. at 1210.
87. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975).
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involves a certain amount of inconvenience and delay.a8 Applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule would consume little pretrial time and
would impose no greater burden than other required procedural
safeguards.89 In contrast, the use of a summary proceeding in
which fourth amendment rights are arbitrarily rejected will instill
bitterness in the probationers and thwart the primary goal of pro-
bation, reintegration into the community. 90 Furthermore, the
charge that the exclusionary rule will deprive the probation de-
partment of important evidence of lack of rehabilitation fails to
consider that a system that depends on illegally seized evidence is
very weak.9" Nothing prevents a probation department from ob-
taining a search warrant. 9 Also, exclusion of the evidence does not
eliminate its rehabilitative usefulness in the corrections system,
since the probation officer may use the evidence to guide his future
relationship with the probationer. In fact, admitting illegally ob-
tained evidence contravenes the rehabilitative purpose of the pro-
bation proceedings in that such admittance rewards violation of
the law.93
Finally, courts rationalize that both society and the offender will
lose the benefits from a sentence of probation, because judges will
be hestitant to place defendants on probation if they know that
evidence of a subsequent violation may not come to light due to
application of the exclusionary rule.'4 This argument has proven to
have no merit.'9 The Supreme Court has expressly noted that seri-
88. Note, Striking the Balance, supra note 82, at 833.
89. The Supreme Court, in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), held that the hear-
ing must entail procedures aimed at protecting a probationer's rights. See Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 863, 882 (1979).
90. Note, Striking the Balance, supra note 82, at 832.
91. W. LAFAVE, supra note 84, at 82.
92. Recent Decisions, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Evidence Obtained by
a Probation Officer's Warrantless Search of a Probationer in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment, is Inadmissible in a Federal Probation Revocation Hearing- United States v.
Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1979), 47 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 863, 882 (1979).
93. According to one commentator:
[s]uccessful rehabilitation depends upon the individual having some measure of
respect for his own worth and some respect for the authority of law in our society.
It would be ironic if the corrections system followed a rule of penal efficiency in
revocation that undermines the'very qualities the system seeks to instill in each
offender.
Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation: A Policy Appraisal,
54 Tax. L. REV. 1115, 1128 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Policy Appraisal].
94. Note, The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 44, at 147.
95. Hon. Richard J. Fitzgerald, Chief Judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Illinois, questioned 25 currently assigned criminal court judges, and the
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ous studies have proven that fair treatment in the revocation pro-
cess will not result in fewer grants of parole." The same is true of
probation.
Application of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation pro-
ceedings serves the deterrent purpose of the rule. Moreover, the
benefits obtained by application of the rule more than offset any
purported harm. Thus, both prongs of the balancing test mandate
application of the exclusionary rule in probation proceedings.
Police Harassment and the Winsett Caveat
Courts that generally refuse to apply the exclusionary rule in
the revocation process recognize that in certain exceptional cir-
cumstances the deterrent value of the rule sufficiently outweighs
the potential harm to the probation system. Some courts limit this
exception to instances where there is demonstrable police harass-
ment of a given probationer.9 Other courts" apply the rule if, at
the time of the arrest and search, the police officers had knowledge
or reason to believe that the suspect was a probationer. 9 Courts
which apply the latter exception reason that if the police officer
knows that the defendant is on probation, the officer will be
tempted to conduct an unlawful search.100 However, the burden of
writer interviewed another 20 judges, who were former criminal court judges, as to the rele-
vancy of the use of the exclusionary rule in the revocation hearing to their decision to grant
probation. All the judges responded to the effect that it would make no difference to them
in deciding if an offender should be placed on probation. Illinois currently follows the rule of
United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975), and does not apply the exclusionary
rule during the revocation hearing. See People v. Knight, 75 Ill. 2d 291, 388 N.E.2d 414
(1979).
96. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 n.10 (1972).
97. See United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rushlow,
385 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
State v. Dulin, 169 Ind. App. 211, 346 N.E.2d 746 (1976).
98. See United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978); Ryan v. Montana,
580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977); Standler v.
Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976); State v.
Towle, 609 P.2d 1097 (Ariz. 1980); People v. Belleci 81 Cal. App. 3d 392, 146 Cal. Rptr. 462
(1978); People v. Ressin, 620 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1981); People v. Knight, 75 Ill. 2d 291, 388
N.E.2d 414 (1979); People v. Watson, 69 Ill. App. 3d 497, 389 N.E.2d 849 (1979); State v.
Davis, 375 So. 2d 69 (La. 1979); State v. Campbell, 43 Or. App. 987, 607 P.2d 745 (1979);
State v. Nettles, 287 Or. 136, 597 P.2d 1243 (1979); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094 (R.I.
1978); State v. Proctor, 16 Wash. App. 866, 559 P.2d 1363 (1977).
99. This exception is known as the "Winsett caveat." See United States v. Winsett, 518
F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975).
100. Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Parole Revocation Hearings: Deterring Official
Infringement of Parolee's Fourth Amendment Rights, 1979 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 161, 171-72
(1979).
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proving harassment or knowledge of probationary status rests on
the accused.101 These exceptions do little to protect fourth amend-
ment rights or further the goals of the judicially created remedy.
An exclusionary standard which relies upon proof of police motive,
inferences of police incentives, or worse yet, claimed lack of knowl-
edge of probationer's status at the time of the search, creates a
danger of police fabrication.102 Such a standard only widens the
credibility gap that is said to exist between the policeman's testi-
mony and the actual arrest situation.0 3 In large metropolitan areas
with modern technology and sophisticated police equipment, of-
ficers will have knowledge of a citizen's probationary status within
minutes after they decide upon a confrontation.'" Yet, the defen-
dant faces a nearly impossible task in proving, at a later hearing,
that the officers are not telling the truth when they testify that
they had no knowledge or reason to believe that the accused was
on probation.
Applying the exclusionary rule in exceptional circumstances of
bad faith on the part of the police will not necessarily protect a
probationer from an overly intrusive search conducted by the po-
lice between the time of the arrest and the placing of formal
charges. The language articulating the bad faith exception may
well be interpreted to mean that protection will be afforded the
defendant only if he can prove that the policeman had knowledge
101. United States v. Rushlow, 385 F. Supp. 795 (S.D. Cal. 1974); People v. Knight, 75
Ill. 2d 291, 388 N.E.2d 414 (1979).
102. See Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1032-33
n.40 (1974); and A Policy Appraisal, supra note 93, at 1125.
103. In New York v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1970), Judge Irving
Younger explained why the "dropsy testimony," consisting of testimony of an arresting po-
lice officer that the suspect dropped a pocket of narcotic drugs to the ground, should be
scrutinized with special caution. See Moylan, The Inventory Search-A Willing Suspension
of Disbelief, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 203 (1976).
104. In March, 1981, the writer interviewed Captain William Hanhardt, Chief of Detec-
tives of the Chicago Police Department, and James O'Grady, former undersheriff of Cook
County. Captain Hanhardt claimed that there are 200 computer equipped squad cars in use
by the police in Chicago. The cars are "strategically located" five to seven in a district, and
twelve in the auto theft unit where a "lot of the action is." The main police station and each
district station is equipped with similar computer systems. Hanhardt explained that by re-
cording the name and "any other relevant information such as social security number or
birth date," the computer will furnish "fairly reliable information" as to an accused criminal
record, including the fact that he is on probation, within 30 seconds. According to Captain
Hanhardt, the City of Chicago plans to have all of its squad cars computer equipped in the
"near future." James O'Grady explained that the source of information for areas outside the
City of Chicago, i.e., suburban Cook County, is not as good as that in the city. In those
areas, it can take a number of days to get a good record of conviction.
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of his probation status at the time of the arrest.10 5 As noted ear-
lier, in this day of modern technology police officers, who have no
knowledge of the defendant's status at the moment of arrest, likely
will receive information as to his criminal record before he is for-
mally taken into custody or charged.'" Armed with information as
to the defendant's criminal history, the officer could conduct a
search beyond the permissible limits of exceptions to the warrant
requirement without being deterred by application of the exclu-
sionary rule.1
0 7
Restricting the officer's relevant knowledge to the time of the
search will not solve the problem of police bad faith. Particularly,
the modified exclusionary remedy does not serve the deterrent aim
of the rule. Except in large metropolitan areas, the officer rarely
will know at the time of arrest that the defendant is on probation.
This lack of knowledge allows police officers to use not only evi-
dence that was gained by "inadvertent"' 08 violations of privacy,
105. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975).
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107. Instances of such overly intrusive searches most likely could arise in the warrant
requirement exceptions of "search incident to arrest" and the "automobile exception." See
supra note 44. A valid search incident to the arrest of an individual is limited to what has
been referred to as the "Chimel perimeter," the area within the arrested person's reach,
lunge, or grasp, where he may destroy evidence of the crime or seize a weapon. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). The license given to a police officer under the Winsett
modified exclusionary rule would permit searches beyond the Chimel perimeter and into
places such as an accused's luggage or home. The "automobile exception," as described in
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), illustrates another example of the weakness of
the Winsett rule. Under the "automobile exception," an officer cannot validly search
throughout the interior of an automobile without probable cause to believe that the auto
contains evidence of a crime and that there are exigent circumstances, i.e., the movability of
the motorized unit. Assume that upon an auto-stop and an arrest for a traffic violation the
arresting officer does not have probable cause to believe that the defendant's automobile
contained evidence of any crime. However, while the officer is writing the traffic citation, a
record check from his computerized squadcar, or a radio message from another officer,
reveals that the motorist is on probation for an old conviction. If the suspicious officer de-
cides to open the trunk of the defendant's car, any incriminating evidence discovered
therein may be offered by the state at a subsequent probation revocation hearing. The state
can successfully urge the court to admit the evidence, because the officer did not have
knowledge of defendant's probation status at the time of his arrest for the traffic violation.
Thus, the Winsett decision caveat may defeat the purpose for which it was intended: evi-
dence will be admissible even though it was seized without justification of one of the "well
defined jealously guarded exceptions to the warrant requirement." Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1970). See supra note 44. For a thorough description of the "search
incident exception," see Moylan, The Automobile Exception-What It Is.Not-A Ratio-
nale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv. 987, 1014 (1976).
108. Justice White finds no deterrent value in excluding evidence where the officers ac-
ted in "good faith" but in technical violation of the fourth amendment. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., concurring). The Attorney General's Task Force Report on
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but also will sanction the use of evidence which may have been
acquired in bad faith. The modified exclusionary rule offered by
courts not only allows the "constable to blunder," but permits him
to do as he pleases and trammel the fourth amendment rights of
those entrusted with probation. 09
Imperative of Judicial Integrity
Although relegated to a lesser role, the "imperative of judicial
integrity"110 remains a necessary ingredient in any decision making
process relative to application of the exclusionary rule during the
probation revocation process.' Probation involves direct and ac-
tive participation by the judiciary in a judgment resulting in im-
prisonment of an individual." 2 The judiciary, indeed, plays an "ig-
noble part" ' s when it accepts unconstitutionally seized evidence
against a probationer, the victim of the search, in an adjudicatory
hearing that results in imprisonment."" Admission during a pro-
bation revocation hearing of tainted evidence, seized in violation of
constitutional rights, clearly makes a mockery of judicial
integrity. 115
Violent Crimes, citing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Wil-
liams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), in pertinent part provides: "In general, evidence should
not be excluded from a criminal proceeding if it has been obtained by an officer acting in
reasonable, good faith belief that it was in conformity to the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT, RECOM-
MENDATION 40, 55 (Aug. 17, 1981).
109. In People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 12, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926), Justice Cardozo ob-
served of the exclusionary rule that "the criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered."
110. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See also supra note 60.
111. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
112. See supra note 6.
113. It is "a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
114. "To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protect-
ing society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those
values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
524 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. In one legal commentary it is suggested that judicial integrity is not violated and
that due process is sufficiently flexible to allow judges to mold the exclusionary rule to fit
the exigencies and demands of a particular situation. See Cole, supra note 44 at 61-62.
However, the Supreme Court historically has demonstrated flexibility and has held the
fourth amendment inapplicable where common sense would so dictate, and the Court has
developed exceptions to the warrant requirement consistent with the needs of law enforce-
ment agencies. See supra note 44. To ask that an additional exception to the warrant re-
quirement be found in the case of probation revocation proceedings would cause the right of
privacy to be pushed below the plimsoll's mark of due process. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352
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Those who oppose application of the rule during the revocation
process claim that United States Supreme Court precedent sup-
ports their position, at least analogously.116 However, these cases
are not only not analogous, but in fact support application of the
exclusionary rule. The Court has held that the exclusionary rule
applies to evidence introduced against a defendant only if he is
also the victim of the search.11 7 If a person satisfies this test, his
status a a probationer should not preclude application of the
rule.118 In a probation revocation hearing the state seeks to use evi-
dence unconstitutionally obtained from the probationer to prove
the violation of his probation and to imprison him. Thus, the pro-
bationer has the requisite standing to invoke the exclusionary rule,
except that the nature of the hearing negates this right.
The Supreme Court has also refused to apply the exclusionary
rule to evidence introduced against a defendant for impeachment
purposes. According to the Court, the exclusionary rule will not
preclude impeachment by the use of statements obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda19 if such statements are otherwise voluntary.12 0
Illegally seized evidence which would ordinarly be inadmissible can
also be used to impeach a defendant when he testifies in his own
behalf and would commit perjury."" Although these impeachment
exceptions apply to a probationer,"' they do not justify the use of
illegally obtained evidence to prove a direct violation of probation.
The Supreme Court has further refused to extend the exclusion-
ary rule to a habeas corpus proceeding, wherein the defendant pe-
titioned to relitigate his fourth amendment claim which had previ-
ously been rejected in the state court. 2 3 The opinion, written by
Justice Powell, explained that where the state has provided an op-
portunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment claim,
U.S. 191, 199 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
116. The opposition cites as instances in which illegally seized evidence has been admit-
ted by the court notwithstanding the "imperative of judicial integrity." Cole, supra note 44,
and Note, The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 44; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954).
117. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). See supra note 45.
118. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1209 (4th Cir. 1979).
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
121. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
122. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1979).
123. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that the evidence ob-
tained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at
his trial. 24 This reasoning does not apply to the revocation pro-
cess, because the probationer has been denied not just full and fair
litigation of his fourth amendment claim-he has been denied any
litigation of his claim.
Finally, the Court has taken the position that allowing a grand
jury witness to invoke the exclusionary rule during the grand jury
proceeding would unduly interfere with the effective and expedi-
tious discharge of the grand jury's duties. '2 The Court has pointed
out that the victim of the search would be given an opportunity to
litigate his fourth amendment claim in the subsequent criminal
trial. '2 In contrast, in the case of the probationer who is subjected
to an alternative prosecution for violation of his probation, no sub-
sequent trial occurs in which to present his fourth amendment
claim, and his possible imprisonment will be accomplished in dis-
regard of those rights. In the same opinion, the Court observed
that standing to invoke the exclusionary rule is strongest where the
government's unlawful conduct could result in imposition of a
criminal sanction on the victim of the search. This appraisal of the
rule bears directly on the probation revocation hearing, because
the evidence is employed to revoke probation and impose a prison
sentence, often as an alternative to a trial on the new charges.'"
In addition to Supreme Court precedent supporting application
of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation proceedings, the
American Bar Association Committee on Probation Standards rec-
ognizes that probation, unlike parole, inherently involves the judi-
cial branch of the government and that a court should "supervise
decisions made under its authority to protect the integrity of its
process.''1s Thus, the American Bar Association recommends that
illegally obtained evidence should not be used to revoke
probation."12
124. Id. at 482.
125. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
126. Id. at 351.
127. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1979).
128. 1980 STANDARDS, supra note 27, § 18-7.5, commentary at 529 (1980).
129. 1980 STANDARDS, supra note 27, § 18-7.5, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Formal arrest of probationers for the alleged violation of conditions of their
probation should be preceded by the issuance of an arrest warrant based on prob-
able cause that a violation has occurred. Arrest without a warrant should be per-
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The imprisonment of a probationer based on unconstitutionally
acquired evidence without a hearing as to the violation of his
fourth amendment rights can only be accomplished if the govern-
ment can establish an exception to the exclusionary rule.'5 0The
burden rests on the government to show that the situation has
made that course imperative."3 ' The government, as laudable as its
motives might be in fighting crime, has failed in its burden because
the price involves forsaking constitutional guarantees.13 2  Courts
should, of course, resist attempts to extend the exclusionary rule
beyond its intended purpose, as society is entitled to constitutional
protection. Vigilant watch over the rights of our citizens, however,
also requires that courts not become a party in the evisceration of
constitutional guarantees.
CONCLUSION
Application of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation
proceedings best serves the rehabilitative purpose of the probation
system by treating probationers fairly, and by demonstrating that
the court will not tolerate misconduct from the probationer or the
police. Application of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation
proceedings also serves the dual purposes of the exclusionary rule:
deterrence of violations of fourth amendment rights and mainte-
nance of judicial integrity. Denial of the rule in a probation revoca-
tion hearing is an unconstitutional act that should not be passed
over in the guise of effective law enforcement. Justice Bardley's
warning in Boyd v. United States,133 in 1886, is worth repeating:
It may be that the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repul-
sive form, but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
mitted only when the violation involves the commission of another crime and the
normal standards for arrest without a warrant have otherwise been met.
(f) When the disputed violation in a revocation proceeding solely relates to the
commission of another crime, the final hearing should not be held before the dis-
position of that criminal charge.
130. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1209 (4th Cir. 1979).
131. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1970).
132. In announcing the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 385 (1914),
Justice Day said of the protection afforded by the fourth amendment:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great princi-
ples established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
Id. at 393.
133. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and silent
deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obvi-
ated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed. A
close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy,
and lends to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon.134
Thus, both constitutional principles and rehabilitation ideals re-
quire adherence to the exclusionary rule in probation revocation
hearings.
134. Id. at 635.
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